We exploit an age discontinuity in a Dutch disability insurance reform to identify the health impact of stricter eligibility criteria and reduced generosity. Our results show substantial adverse effects on life expectancy for women subject to the more stringent criteria. A €1,000 reduction in annual benefits leads to a 2.4 percentage points higher probability of death more than 10 years after the reform. This negative health effect is restricted to women with low pre-disability earnings. We find that the mortality rate of men subject to the stricter rules is reduced by 0.7 percentage points. The evidence for the existence of substantial health effects implies that policymakers considering a disability insurance reform should carefully balance the welfare gains from reduced moral hazard against losses not only from less coverage of income risks but also from deteriorated health.
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The standard welfare evaluation of DI weighs the gains from insuring income risk against the losses from moral hazard incentives to reduce work effort.
2 Welfare improving reforms encourage the work-able to re-enter employment.
Because work capacity is not perfectly observable, a problem which lies at the heart of the moral hazard problem, there is 1 For an overview of the various reforms in the Dutch DI during the 1990s and 2000s, see Van Sonsbeek and Gradus (2013) and Koning and Lindeboom (2015) . 2 There is a substantial literature showing the presence of moral hazard in DI (e.g., Autor & Duggan, 2003 Bound, 1989; Bound & Burkhauser, 1999; Chen & van der Klaauw, 2008) and the effectiveness of policies that tighten DI in reducing the number of claimants and bringing people back to work (Autor & Duggan, 2003; Borghans et al., 2014 ).
a risk that mistakes are made in any rationalization program or that the process goes too far, such that partially incapacitated individuals for whom work takes an inordinate toll on health are forced back into employment. The health impact may operate, for example, through stress related to re-entry into the labor market, or from work tasks that are physically demanding given certain health conditions. Although there is recent evidence that DI benefit recipients respond to reduced DI benefit generosity and tighter DI benefit eligibility by taking up new employment (Borghans, Gielen, & Luttmer, 2014; Moore, 2015) , there is no evidence yet about potential health effects after such a DI reform. This paper examines whether adverse health effects may arise as a result of more stringent DI. In particular, we focus on mortality. Other studies investigating health effects of unexpected job loss have documented several health effects such as increased hospitalizations and mortality (Browning & Heinesen, 2012; Eliason & Storrie, 2009; Sullivan & von Wachter, 2009 ). An unexpected loss of DI benefits might has similar health consequences, as it likely leads to stress associated to financial strain and/or forced re-entry into the labor market, all of which might translate into adverse health effects and possibly an increased mortality risk over time. Evidence for any such effects of a DI reform implies a direct loss in welfare. On the other hand, health may also improve if postreform re-employment improves the cognitive ability of individuals as is often found in the retirement literature (Bonsang, Adam, & Perelman, 2012; Mazzonna & Peracchi, 2012 , 2017 Rohwedder & Willis, 2010) .
We provide the first evidence we are aware of on the mortality impact of DI reform by examining the consequences of a Dutch reform in 1993 that entailed medical re-examination of DI recipients, stricter eligibility criteria, and benefit cuts. Identification comes from an age discontinuity-the eligibility criteria were made significantly more stringent for disability recipients aged below 45 on August 1, 1993. Borghans et al. (2014) have shown that many DI beneficiaries experienced benefit cuts following the medical re-examination, and the average reduction was about 10% higher for the younger cohort subject to the more stringent criteria. Furthermore, their results also reveal a strong rebound in labor market earnings of 0.62 Euros for each Euro of lost DI benefits and an increase in other social security benefits of 0.30 Euros for each Euro of lost DI benefits. Hence, the reform clearly had a substantial effect on the labor market position of (former) DI claimants, and as such, it may also have had health implications for those affected by the stricter re-examinations.
In this paper, we further exploit this discontinuity in the reform by comparing mortality-both in the short and in the longer run-of individuals younger than the 45-year-old cutoff at the time of the reform to the outcomes of individuals older than this threshold. The reform was introduced with little warning, and so differences in DI generosity arising from it could not have been anticipated. To estimate the effect on health, we use administrative panel data providing information on mortality for the total population of Dutch DI claimants.
We find that the reform had a substantial negative impact on the health of female DI claimants. According to the reduced-form estimates, women subject to the stricter DI eligibility criteria had a 1.4 percentage point higher probability of dying within 17 years after the reform.
3 The probability that males die within 17 years after the reform is estimated to have been reduced by a statistically significant 1.2 percentage points. We find that the negative health effects are concentrated among low earning females. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the reform used for identification. Section 3 describes the data, Section 4 describes the empirical strategy, and Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 concludes.
| DISABILITY INSURANCE IN THE NETHERLANDS

| Prereform
In the Netherlands, all employees were and are still insured against an earnings loss resulting from an illness or infirmity. In the first year after the onset of a disability, individuals are entitled to sickness payments. After this first year, they can apply for DI benefits. 4 Note that there is allowance for partial disability, and health insurance is not tied to the receipt of DI benefits.
3 Note that this is 14 years after the re-examinations, which took place in 1996/1997 for this relevant cohort. 4 Further institutional background information on the Dutch disability act and recent trends and patterns in disability insurance enrollment in the Netherlands can be found in Bovenberg (2000) , García-Gómez, von Gaudecker, and Lindeboom (2011) , and Koning and Lindeboom (2015) , respectively.
The amount of DI benefit depends on the "degree of disability," which equals the percentage difference between earnings before disability and the potential earnings of the applicant, which prior to the 1993 reform was determined in three steps. First, the applicant was examined by a medical doctor, who compiled a list of job demands that the applicant could still meet.
5 Second, this list was compared to a dictionary of occupations that specified the job demands, as well as the required education level, for each occupation in order to identify a set of occupations the applicant would be able to perform. Only occupations that were no more than two education levels (on a 7-point scale) below the level demanded in the applicant's previous occupation were considered. Finally, the applicant's potential earnings capacity was defined as the mean wage of the five highest paying occupations in the set of feasible ones, with the further proviso that at least 10 workers should be currently engaged in each of the occupations in the applicant's region (though there should not necessarily be that number of vacancies). 6 When five suitable occupations with at least 10 workers could not be identified, the potential earnings capacity was set at 0. The degree of disability was then defined by the percentage loss in earnings due to disability, that is, the difference between prior labor earnings 7 and the potential earnings capacity divided by prior labor earnings and grouped into eight categories varying from 0-15% to 80-100%. The replacement rate was then determined by these categories (see online Appendix Table A1 ).
| The reform
The 1993 reform was designed to lower the generosity of disability benefits and to reduce the number of (full) disability claimants. 8 With this aim, the criteria to define the earnings capacity were changed in two respects. 9 First, eligibility was only based on objective medical information not the doctor's judgment. This required that a functional work limitation was clearly observable and could be linked directly to a medical diagnosis. As a result, disabilities related to mental health problems became more difficult to prove. Second, the criteria for identifying suitable occupations were relaxed, such that (a) all education levels could be considered, (b) only three occupations (rather than five) with at least 10 workers employed were required to calculate the mean potential earnings, and (c) the geographic region within which there should be employment in the occupations was expanded roughly threefold. 10 These changes increased the probability of finding a higher-paid occupation that the applicant could still perform and thereby raised the potential earnings capacity. Furthermore, it became less likely that the potential earnings capacity was set at 0 because insufficient occupations could be identified. For any individual who was enrolled in DI, the potential earnings capacity under the new criteria was always higher than under the old criteria, and hence, DI benefits were lower. The new criteria for determining the potential earnings capacity applied both to new applicants and to existing claimants aged younger than 50 at the time of the reform (August 1, 1993). Existing claimants were to be re-examined, which was scheduled to take place by age cohort from 1994 onwards: those aged <35 on August 1, 1993 August 1, in 1994 August 1, , 35-40 in 1995 August 1, , 41-44 in 1996 August 1, /1997 August 1, , and 45-49 in 1997 August 1, -2001 . However, shortly before the re-examinations of the 45-49 cohort started, political pressure 11 led to a parliamentary motion passed in November 1996 ruling that this cohort would be assessed on the prereform, more lax criteria. This created a discontinuity in DI stringency between the cohort under the age of 45 and those aged 45-49 that we exploit to estimate the effects of reduced generosity on health outcomes.
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5 The complete list includes 27 physical job demands and 10 psychological skills. 6 For this procedure, the Netherlands was divided in five regions and in 16 "start regions." Alternative jobs in the "start regions" had to be considered first. Only if less than five suitable occupations were available, alternative jobs in the neighboring regions (within one of the main five regions) could be considered.
3 | DATA
| Data sources
We extract our data from several large administrative databases maintained by Statistics Netherlands. Individuals can be matched across the various data files by a Random Identification Number, which is an encrypted Dutch equivalent of the U.S. social security number.
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We use administrative data on all disability benefits recipients aged 15-64 in the Netherlands for the period 1995-2005. These data originate from the organizations that administered the disability benefits at the time. They include information on entry and exit dates of a disability spell, the degree of disability (in categories), labor earnings prior to DI entry, and disability benefit payments. Unfortunately, there is no reliable or consistent information about the medical condition that led to enrollment.
Demographic characteristics of the claimants are obtained from the municipal registries. These contain information on date of birth (year and month), nationality, marital status, and place of residence for all residents of the Netherlands.
Information on other sources of income are obtained by merging five different administrative datasets: earnings from paid employment of all employees, self-employment earnings, unemployment benefits, general assistance, and receipt of other types of social assistance (from about 30 relatively minor programs). Information about income from paid employment and self-employment comes from the tax authorities and social insurance records, whereas the data on social assistance are provided by the organizations that administer these programs. All these files are available from 1999 onwards.
Last, we obtain information on death from mortality registries covering the entire Dutch population. Mortality records are available for the period 1996-2010 from the reports filed by a medical examiner or pathologist.
| Sample definition
Our baseline sample consists of all individuals who (a) received DI benefits on August 1, 1993, (b) were aged between 40 and 50 on that date, (c) were still on DI as of January 1, 1996, and (d) are native Dutch. The first restriction follows from the fact that the discontinuity in DI generosity only applies to disability claimants enrolled at the time the reform went into effect. The second restriction is made to create a sample of individuals who are relatively comparable in all other respects except for the assessment of earnings capacity made during re-examination and the consequent difference in DI generosity. The standard criterion by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) for setting the window of a regression discontinuity (RD) would suggest taking an estimation sample only including claimants aged between 43 and 47. However, with this age window, there is insufficient power: at most 0.30 for males and 0.25 for females. Therefore, we have extended the age window to claimants aged 40 to 50. Results for the smaller sample are rather comparable to those for the wider sample (see Section 5.2 for more details). The third restriction is imposed by the fact that data on DI status are available only from 1996.
14 From those observed on DI in January 1996, we select those whose records show they have been claiming at least since January 1, 1993. Given that the re-examinations of the individuals in our sample did not start before 1996 and the parliamentary motion excluding the cohort aged 45 and above from the more stringent criteria was only passed in November 1996, we do not expect any differential attrition to have taken place around the age of 45 prior to January 1, 1996. 15 This assumption is supported by online Appendix Figure A1 where we show that there is no differential exit out of DI for individuals aged below and above 45 in 1995. Finally, the last restriction comes from the fact that we have to drop all non-native Dutch from our sample because of two major problems with certain groups of immigrants that potentially invalidate the identification strategy. First, more than a proportional share of Turkish immigrants is registered as being born in January, which reflects inaccurate birth registration and is problematic for our identification based on date of birth.
16 Second, there are large differences in 13 These data can be accessed via a remote-access computer after a confidentiality statement has been signed.
14 For 1995, we only have information on those who left DI not on those who stayed on DI. Hence, information on continuing DI spells is only available from January 1, 1996.
15 Please note that throughout this paper, we refer to cohorts by their age at the time the reform went into effect (i.e., as of August 1, 1993). 16 It was common for families in rural areas of Turkey not to register new-born children immediately after they were born but rather to wait until more children were born and then register them all at once. Very often, parents did not remember the exact birth date of all their children while at the registration office and registered them as being born on January 1.
the share of immigrants from the East Indies across cohorts on either side of the threshold determining exposure to the more stringent test. 17 We cannot rule out that there are similar problems with other groups of immigrants. We decide to take a conservative approach and drop all non-native individuals from our sample given that there are differences in health and life-expectancy between individuals from different ethnic backgrounds. However, we will show in Section 5.2 that the results are not changed when non-native Dutch are included in the sample. After these sample restrictions, our baseline sample in 1996 contains 91,089 males and 46,670 females in 1996. 3.3 | Summary statistics Table 1 presents a summary of our variables of interest. Panel A shows the characteristics of the individuals in our sample as of January 1, 1996 before they were re-examined. On average, the claimants in our sample have spent 7-8 years on DI at the time the reform was implemented. The majority of the sample is fully disabled (between 80% and 100% earnings reduction). This holds in particular for women. Panel B presents the mortality rate for the last year of our observation period. The mortality rate was higher for men. By 2010, 15.6% of the male, but only 11.2% of the female, DI claimants had died.
| EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
The 1993 DI reform in the Netherlands has had a significant impact on the average benefits that a DI claimant received. On average, disability benefits were reduced by €1,549 and €607 for men and women under the age of 45, respectively (see Figure 1 , panel I). This amounts to a drop of about 13% and 7% of total DI benefits for men and women, Note. Because we have information available from 1996 onwards, the degree of disability is recorded in January 1996 (before the re-examinations). DI = disability insurance.
respectively. These first stage effects are in line with those in Borghans et al. (2014) . Note that these are average reductions in DI benefits; some individuals experienced a decrease in benefits, whereas others experienced no change in benefits at all (or even an increase). About 12-13% of men and women under the age of 45 faced a reduction in DI benefits after the re-examinations, contrary to only 3.4% and 2.5% of men and women aged 45 and older, respectively (see Table 1 ). The more stringent re-examinations not only reduced the generosity of the DI program for individuals remaining on DI, it also led to additional exit out of disability of about 5.6 and 6.9 percentage points for men and women, respectively (see Figure 1 , panel II). In fact, we observe that DI exits account for more than 90% of the cases where a DI claimant experienced a drop in DI benefits. Hence, exit from the program is an important effect of the DI reform, and the differential impact on changes in DI benefits is likely due to the fact that prereform benefits for men exceed those of women (as men's pre-disability earnings were on average 45% higher than those of women, see Table 1 ). We exploit these first stage effects to examine whether the reform had any impact on health outcomes. Note that we are identifying the effect of a change in disability benefit income on health outcomes; it is not the effect of a change in total income on health.
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19 Borghans et al. (2014) have shown that total income was only slightly reduced for men and was unchanged for women because the reduced benefits were to a large extent compensated by increased employment earnings or additional income from other benefits. In our regression models, treatment is indicated by a dummy equal to 1 for those subject to the stricter re-examinations (i.e., those aged under 45). Our set of controls include age in months as of August 1, 1993 , an interaction between the treatment indicator and age measured in months younger/older than 45 in August 1993 to allow the age trend to differ on either side of the discontinuity, six dummies for the degree of disability on January 1, 1996, pre-DI earnings, 39 regional dummies, marital status, and duration on DI at the start of the reform. To control for seasonal patterns in mortality by month of birth (Doblhammer & Vaupel, 2001 ), we also control for 12 months of birth dummies. Finally, we include a dummy for those born between May 1945 and January 1946 and a dummy for those born between February 1946 and January 1947 to allow for potential differences in the composition of the baby boom generation and for the possibility that those born shortly after World War II differ in health status from other cohorts because of conception during the last months of the war that were particularly harsh in the Netherlands (Scholte, van den Berg, & Lindeboom, 2012) .
One key identifying assumption in this study is that the stringency of the criteria applied during the DI re-examinations is the only discontinuous change relevant to mortality at the cutoff age of 45. Although the data do not allow us to test this, we are not aware of any other policy change that would create a discontinuity around this age. To give more credibility to our results, we test whether there are any discontinuities around age 45 in our predetermined control variables by regressing all covariates used in the analysis on the treatment indicator in a reduced-form RD specification. Under the null hypothesis that there is no effect, from 51 placebo regressions, we would expect to find a significant coefficient for only three (at 5%) or five (at 10%) of the covariates. We find a significant effect for only three of them.
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Another key assumption guaranteeing the validity of our approach is the fact that individuals should not be able to influence the running variable, that is, age at August 1, 1993. Because individuals cannot easily change their actual or reported age in the Netherlands, we do not expect any manipulation of reported age. This is further confirmed by online Appendix Figure A2 , which shows a histogram of the DI claimant's age at the time of the reform. Although the figure displays some variation, there is no substantial change in claimant's age around the age cutoff. Also a McCrary (2008) density test provides further evidence for a smooth density around age 45 (p value = .114). Note that we do observe a drop in the histogram around age 47.5 that is due to the famine resulting from the hunger winter that took place in the Netherlands during World War II. Hence, this drop is not related to the DI reform. Nevertheless, we control for this event in our regressions (as described above). Figure 2 shows the probability of death by 2010 for the individuals in our sample. There is an upward jump in the male mortality rate at the age of 45, which corresponds to the age from which the more generous DI reassessment applied but a downward jump in female mortality. Estimating a reduced-form RD model for mortality in earlier years (Figure 3) , we find the positive effect on mortality for women and the negative effect for men to be consistent over time, where the magnitude of both increases over time and reaches significance in the last 2 years (see also online Appendix Table A3 for the complete estimation results). Men aged below 45 who were subject to the stricter regime had a 1.2 percentage point lower probability of having died by 2010 than older men, controlling for age. Younger women that experienced the tighter reassessment had a 1.4 percentage point higher probability of death, which corresponds to a relative effect of about 13%. Interpreting these estimates as causal effects would suggest that tightening the eligibility criteria and reducing benefits raised the mortality rate of women but reduced that of men. In Section 5.2, we show that these results are robust to various robustness checks. Borghans et al. (2014) have shown that the reform induced women to take up new employment and also to apply for other benefits at a higher rate than men. This suggests that women may have been affected more by the reform than men. In addition, the gender difference in mortality may be the result of different social norms to working or to different health problems for men and women. We will discuss the potential explanations for the gender difference in health outcomes in detail in Section 5.4.
| RESULTS
| Impact on mortality
The reduced-form RD point estimates shown in Figure 3 and online Appendix Table A3 show the average effect of the reform on mortality. However, some individuals were affected more by the reform than others. That is, some individuals lost all their DI benefits because they were considered ineligible under the new criteria, whereas others experienced only a marginal reduction in their benefits. We exploit this variation in DI benefit changes in an IV standard fuzzy RD specification, where we scale our reduced-form estimates by the amount of the reduction in disability benefits. 21 The IV estimates in Table 2 show that the mortality effects are larger for those who experienced a larger drop in DI benefits. For example, a €1,000 reduction in DI benefits led to an increase in the cumulative mortality rate by 2010 among women of 2.4 percentage points, which is a relative increase of 23%. 22 For men, we find that a €1,000 reduction in DI benefits has led to a 0.7 percentage point (i.e., 6%) reduction in mortality by 2010.
It is important to note that although our mortality effects only appear from 2009 onwards, they are not caused by any of the later DI reforms. As Koning and Lindeboom (2015) carefully describe, after 1993, there have been several DI reforms which aimed at (a) enhancing employer incentives to avoid an inflow of employees in DI, (b) increasing screening for disability, and (c) tightening eligibility for continued DI benefit receipt. Although these reforms could 21 This is the change in DI benefits due to the reform. IV estimates are obtained by dividing the reduced-form estimates by the first stage effect, that is, the change in DI benefits due to the reform. More details on this approach can also be found in Borghans et al. (2014) . Note that benefits are set to missing for those already deceased by January 1999. 22 Unfortunately, we have insufficient observations for each cause of death to investigate whether this result is driven by certain specific causes of death. have affected people who continued to be on DI after the re-examinations, none of these reforms had a differential impact on the 40-to 44-year-old cohort versus the 45-to 49-year-old cohort in our study. In fact, there was no particular discontinuity in treatment for any age in our 40-50 cohort. As such, these later DI reforms are no threat for our identifying assumptions. Furthermore, one might wonder whether the long-term mortality effects could be due to recent changes in early retirement schemes, because our sample individuals who were aged Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. Each entry in the table comes from a separate regression. In the IV regressions, the variable that is instrumented is the amount of DI, so the parameter estimate can be interpreted as the change in the cumulative mortality rate for every €1,000 decrease in DI spending per year. The instrument itself is the treatment dummy (age less than 45 as of August 1, 1993). The following controls are used in the regressions: a dummy for being subject to the strict re-examinations (treatment), its interaction with aged 45, age in months as of August 1, 1993, six dummies for degree of disability in 1996, pre-DI earnings, a dummy for being married in 1996, a dummy for being conceived during and born shortly after WWII (May 1945 -February 1946 , a dummy for being conceived and born after WWII (February 1946 -January 1947 , 39 regional dummies, 11 months of birth dummies, and duration in DI at the start of the reform. Results for all other covariates are not presented here but are available upon request. DI = disability insurance. 
FIGURE 3
Reduced-form effects of disability insurance reform on mortality 1996-2010 more details), none of these changes affected our 40-to 44-year-old cohort differently than it affected our 45-to 49-year-old cohort. 
| Robustness of the results
In Table 3 , we present the results of various sensitivity analyses. Panel A shows the results of reduced-form RD estimations without any control variables. Clearly, the results are not sensitive to inclusion of the controls. The mortality effects remain −0.012 for males and 0.014 for females, just as was found when controls were included in the regression (Figure 3) . In panel B, we include a quadratic in age in the model. The results remain mostly unchanged. Panel C shows the outcomes when all immigrants are included in the sample. The results for women remain unchanged. For men, the significant mortality effects disappear. This is consistent with differences in the share of immigrants (at least from East Indies) between age groups, and lower life expectancy of non-natives compared to natives. In addition, measurement error in the month and year of birth would bias our estimates towards zero. We also perform several placebo tests. In panel D, we re-estimate our models on a sample of disability claimants aged 50-59, applying an artificial age discontinuity at age 55. Note that DI claimants aged 50 and above were not re-examined at all nor did any of the new eligibility criteria apply to them. Hence, we should not find any significant effect for these placebo estimations. The results in panel D confirm this. A final placebo test concerns the estimation of our model on a sample of individuals who were not receiving DI at the time of the reform. The results in panel E show that there is no discontinuity in mortality for this sample, which provides further confidence on the absence of any other confounding factors that might occur at the cutoff age 45. This confirms the validity of our approach.
As mentioned in Section 3, we choose a larger bandwidth than would be optimal according to the Imbens-Kalyanaraman criterium given the lack of power for the smaller bandwidth. One may be concerned that the health effects are therefore driven by the inclusion of individuals further away from the threshold so they are the result of age differences. For the results for women, we argue that it is unlikely to be the case as treated individuals are younger and this would imply lower mortality for the treated group. However, for men, we cannot rule out that this is the case. We investigate how sensitive our results are to the chosen bandwidth size. Online Appendix Figure  A3 illustrates that the point estimates of our models are quite robust to bandwidth size. 24 More specifically, the results remain rather stable after the optimal bandwidth of 24 months as defined by the Imbens-Kalyamaran procedure. The standard errors of the estimates, however, are sensitive to the bandwidth, and the figures show that as the power increases (larger bandwidth includes larger number of observations), the estimates also become more precise.
| Are the effects driven by changes in employment or total income?
Our results show that changes in the DI generosity have important health effects on DI recipients. The negative health effects among women are likely to be driven by increased stress related to new employment situation or reduced benefit income, and/or occupational diseases if the person enters into paid employment. The reduced generosity of this reform has been found to have a large effect on employment and only a very small effect on total income. Borghans et al. (2014) have shown that participation in employment went up by 2.9 percentage points after the reform and that also total income changed, albeit only marginally. We exploit our information on employment status and total income to disentangle the importance of both in explaining the mortality effects. We re-estimate our IV models using two additional scaling variables: a dummy for whether the individual is in paid employment in 1999 and individual total income in 1999 (i.e., after the re-examinations were finished). Panel A of Table 4 shows that conclusions are similar if we use employment status as the scaling variable and the treatment dummy as the instrument. There are health costs (gains) for those women (men) that get into paid employment due to the stricter eligibility criteria. On the other hand, income changes driven by the reform do not seem to explain changes in mortality (panel B). For women, the reform did not have an effect on total income (no first stage effect). This is in line with the finding by Borghans et al. (2014) that individuals are able to fully compensate a drop in DI benefits via higher labor market earnings and/or other benefits. For men, the reform had a small effect on total income, but a €1,000 reduction in total 23 Ages refer to those on August 1, 1993. By 2009, these ages would be 56-60 and 61-65. Sixty-five was the official retirement age. 24 Only for very small bandwidths they are quite different, but one should be careful interpreting these point estimates because also the standard errors are very large.
income is not associated with a statistically significant mortality effect. Therefore, the previous mortality effects for men and women must be driven by individuals who left DI and moved into employment due to the more stringent DI criteria and not by those who stayed on DI with reduced benefits.
| Why did the reform only harm the health of women?
Our results have shown clear gender differences in the health effects of the Dutch DI reform. It is possible that the reform affected men and women in a different way. We have already seen (see Figure 1 ) that the average reduction in DI benefits due to the reform is larger for men than for women (1,549 Euros vs. 607 Euros) but that the probability to leave DI Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. Each entry in the table comes from a separate regression. See the note in Table 3 for the demographic controls included in the regression. Results for all other covariates are not presented here but are available upon request. after the re-examinations is larger for women (6.9 percentage points vs. 5.6 percentage points). Given that we observe that terminations of DI eligibility (i.e., DI exits) account for more than 90% of the cases where a DI claimant experienced a drop in DI benefits, this gender difference in exits strongly suggests that women are more affected by the reform than men. Further evidence is provided by Borghans et al. (2014) , who have shown that both the probability to take up employment and the probability to obtain other benefits increased significantly more for women than for men. One of the reason for the gender-specific impact of the reform could be related to gender-specific health problems. One of the implications of the new criteria is that disabilities related to mental health problems became more difficult to prove than physical health problems (see Section 2). Women are more likely to suffer from mental problems, whereas men are more likely to suffer from physical health problems, such as musculoskeletal and cardiovascular problems (UWV, 2006). These differences might lead to differential exit from DI across both genders: One would expect the average man who left DI to be healthier than the average woman who left DI, because for women, the share of exits due to ineligible type of illness -that is, mental health problems that are difficult to diagnose-is larger. This could explain the gender differences as employment may be more hazardous when initial health is poor. Similarly, one might also expect heterogeneous effects by type of health condition. Unfortunately, information about type of illness is missing in our data, so we cannot test for this.
In order to ascertain what can explain the gender differences, we pool observations for men and women and make a distinction by three other variables that may drive these results: degree of disability (full/partial), disability duration, and earnings level. The results are shown in Table 5 . 25 First, women are more likely to be fully disabled compared to men (see Table 1 ). One would expect that fully disabled would suffer more from a DI reform that decreases the amount of benefits and encourages disabled individuals to go back to work than partially disabled, as the labor market opportunities for the former are expected to be worse. The DI reform raises the probability of mortality by 2010 for both fully and partial disabled women, but it decreases the probability of mortality by 2010 only for fully disabled men (panel A of Table 5 ). In addition, the estimated effect is statistically different for males and females in the two subgroups (partial and fully disabled). This suggests that the gender-specific findings cannot (only) be attributed to differences in the level of disability between genders.
Second, we investigate the time spent on DI at the time the reform came into effect. On the one hand, individuals who have been on DI for longer may suffer more from forced labor market re-entry as they have been detached from the labor market for longer. On the other hand, the health of long-term disabled may have improved whereas on DI, therefore, they may well be able to find re-employment without this having adverse health effects. From Table 1 , we know that women have slightly shorter DI spells than men. Panel B of Table 5 shows separate results by time spent in DI. We find that the mortality effects for men are concentrated among long-term disabled, whereas there are negative effects for women who are either long-term or short-term disabled. Moreover, the difference in the direction of the effect between males and females remains among the long-term disabled. This suggests that our findings are not driven solely by differences in the time spent on DI across genders.
There are large differences in the labor market history and opportunities between men and women, as women tend to be low wage earners. Therefore, our results could be well driven by lower wage earners (mainly women) having to return to more health hazardous jobs compared to higher earners (mainly men). In panel C of Table 5 , we separately estimate the effect of the reform for those below and above the median level 26 of labor market earnings (measured before entry in DI). We find that the negative health effects are indeed concentrated among low earning women, whereas the positive health effects for men are concentrated among high-earning men. Figure 4 shows the reduced-form RD effects on mortality over time for the four different groups (low earnings females, high earnings females, low earnings males, and high earnings males). We find that the positive health effects on high-earning males affected by the reform are apparent in the short-run (from 1998). Moreover, the estimated effect on high-earning females is similar both in size and sign and not statistically different to the estimated effect on high-earning males, although it is never statistically significant. The lack of statistical significance can be due to the low number of females that are among the high earners, as only 24% of females have pre-DI earnings above the median. The differences between high-earning males and low-earning 25 In online Appendix Table A4 , we investigate the characteristics of "compliers", that is, those individuals who are affected on the margin by the stricter re-examination. Hence, compliers refer to those individuals who experience a decrease in their degree of disability following the stricter reexamination criteria but would not have experienced a decrease in their degree of disability under the old and more lenient criteria. Because our results suggest that partially disabled women are more likely to experience a reduction in their benefits than the female sample as whole, in Table 5 , we investigate further whether the gender-specific results are related to initial degree of disability.
26 Note that we use the overall median wage not gender specific. When using gender specific medians, we could not separate the gender effects from the earnings effect.
females are clear since the early 2000s. This suggests that part of the gender differences is due to differences in the skill level between males and females in our sample. However, this cannot be the only explanation as the reform did not have any effect on low-earning males. In addition, these results pose some equity concerns on the effects of the DI reform, as the health gains are concentrated among the high-earners whereas the losses are concentrated among the low-earners. Furthermore, gender differences in occupational sorting may be responsible for these differential health effects. LaMontagne, Keegel, Vallance, Ostry, and Wolfe (2008) have shown that job strain related to depression is mostly concentrated in low-skilled occupations, and national statistics show that female recipients in the relevant age group are about 10 percentage points more likely to suffer from mental health problems compared to males (UWV, 2006) . Hence, this suggests that the combination of the type of health problems and the occupational position makes women more vulnerable to the reform. Unfortunately, type of illness is not registered in our data, and we cannot test this hypothesis directly.
Finally, the differential gender effect on mortality may be the result of different social norms to working. We know from earlier studies that leaving employment after job loss has severe and long-lasting effects on mortality (Bloemen, Hochguertel, & Zweerink, 2015; Eliason & Storrie, 2009; Sullivan & von Wachter, 2009 ) and that these effects are larger the stronger is the social norm to working (Stutzer & Lalive, 2004) . If the effects of losing a job are symmetric, but opposite, to the effects of regaining employment, then one may argue that forced exit from disability and the subsequent re-employment may have beneficial effects on mortality. These effects are expected to be largest for men, as the social norm to working is strongest for them. For women, the positive effects may be outweighed by the negative effects following from the type of health problem and occupational position of women as discussed above. Unfortunately, the data do not allow us to test the role of social norms in explaining the different health outcomes across men and women.
| CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigate whether DI reform aiming to contain moral hazard may have additional welfare effects via changes in people's health. Welfare improving reforms aim to encourage the work-able to become re-employed. However, when this is pushed too far and even less work-able are forced back to work, this may come at a long-term cost to their health. We exploit a cohort discontinuity in the stringency of the 1993 Dutch disability reforms to obtain causal estimates of the effects of decreased generosity of DI on health outcomes of existing DI recipients. We find that the reform in Dutch DI has had important health effects, which last for more than 15 years after the reform. Women aged 44 and younger that are subjected to the stricter re-examinations experience a worsening in their health status over time as their mortality was increased by 1.4 percentage points by 2010. For men, on the other hand, mortality rates were reduced by 1.2 percentage points. We find that pre-DI earnings differences play an important role in explaining these gender differences as the health gains are concentrated among high-earning males, whereas the health costs are mostly borne by low-earning females. An alternative plausible explanation for the gender difference is that the reform affected men and women in a different way. Alternatively, different social norms to work may apply for men and women, which may explain the gender different in health outcomes. Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to test these explanations, and this is left for future research.
Regardless of the specific driving mechanisms behind these gender differences, our results illustrate that there were clear winners and losers from this reform. We believe this is a relevant lesson applicable to other institutional settings and DI reforms. On the one hand, tightening of the eligibility criteria to reduce moral hazard cannot only increase labor force participation but also improve population health if targeted to the appropriate groups. On the other hand, if the criteria do not allow benefits entitlement to individuals in some vulnerable groups, the incentives to go back to work may cause irreversible damage to their health. In order to advance in the identification of the groups that can benefit from a DI reform and the groups that society needs to protect, future research should focus on better identification of the effects of DI policies on individuals with different health conditions and in different occupational groups.
Although the magnitudes of our estimated effects are obviously specific to the particular Dutch reform, the broad conclusions are relevant in a wider context. Health deterioration arising from measures that push (female) DI recipients back to work suggests that the extent of moral hazard may have been overstated. An employment response to DI FIGURE 4 Reduced-form effects of disability insurance reform on mortality 1996-2010, by previous earnings eligibility rules and generosity is not sufficient to conclude that moral hazard exists. The difficulty in defining and containing moral hazard with respect to DI lies in the fact that disability is not a clear-cut medical condition. Rather, it is a threshold on a continuum of work incapacity and the pain and discomfort associated with work that is defined by the policymaker (Diamond & Sheshinski, 1995) . Reforms that tighten the eligibility criteria and so raise the threshold of work incapacity may induce individuals who can only work under excessive duress to take up employment causing health to deteriorate. This argument does not deny the existence of substantial moral hazard in DI nor does it claim that reforms are unnecessary to reduce moral hazard. Rather, the point is that setting the threshold of work incapacity involves balancing losses from the Type I errors that represent moral hazard with the losses from Type II errors that arise when individuals who can only work at an excessive cost to their health are denied DI. Given the generosity of the Dutch DI program in the 1990s, one would expect the marginal individual affected by the 1993 reform to have been in better health than the marginal DI recipient in a less generous scheme. This suggests that the negative health effects of tightening DI in other countries and periods may be even greater than we estimate for the Dutch setting.
All in all, our results indicate that the moral hazard debate should change dramatically: The discussion should not only focus on the tradeoff between providing DI and making people go back to work but also on other important behavioral effects that may not only compensate the savings from reduction in the DI generosity but entail additional costs in other government budgets and the society as a whole.
